



AETFA

July/August 2012

No. 27

SA Unions, the SA Working Women's Centre and the Australia East Timor Friendship Association invites you to:

A FILM FUNDRAISER FOR THE TIMOR LESTE WORKING WOMEN'S CENTRE

The Sapphires (2012)

WEDNESDAY 15 AUGUST 2012

5.30PM – WINE & NIBBLES

6.30PM - FILM STARTS

THE CAPRI THEATRE

141 Goodwood Rd, GOODWOOD

ADMISSION: \$20 [WAGED] \$15 [CONC.]

Tickets available from:

Ph Andy (AETFA): 8371 0480;

Email andyalcock@internode.on.net

Storyline

1968 was the year that changed the world. And for four young Aboriginal sisters from a remote mission this is the year that would change their lives forever. Around the globe, there was protest and revolution in the streets. Indigenous Australians finally secured the right to vote. There were drugs and the shock of a brutal assassination. And there was Vietnam. The sisters, Cynthia, Gail, Julie and Kay are discovered by Dave, a talent scout with a kind heart, very little rhythm but a great knowledge of soul music. Billed as Australia's answer to 'The Supremes', Dave secures the sisters their first true gig, and fly's them to Vietnam to sing for the American troops. Based on a true story, THE SAPPHIRES is a triumphant celebration of youthful emotion, family and music. Written by Goalpost Pictures.

BACKGROUND ON THE TIMOR-LESTE WORKING WOMEN'S CENTRE

In September 2011, APHEDA Union Aid Abroad was proud to help launch the Working Women's Centre Timor-Leste – the first dedicated service for women to better access their employment rights and combat gender violence in the workplace in Timor-Leste.

The South Australian Working Women's Centre is playing an important role in helping to establish this Centre.

The Timor Leste Working Women's Centre educates and advocates on behalf of Timorese working women, including vulnerable domestic workers, for free.

Women of Timor-Leste have long held traditional roles in the home and many women are now seeking employment to help lift themselves and their families from chronic poverty. Timor-Leste is the poorest country in our region due to the illegal occupation by the Indonesian military, which was responsible for wiping out 1/4 of the population, committing gross human rights abuses and destroying 80% of the country's infrastructure

About two-thirds of adult women have never attended school and employment opportunities for those without a formal education are limited.

Most of the work available to women in Timor-Leste is characterised by 'informal' workplace arrangements. Jobs are paid cash in hand, without negotiation on fair wages or conditions, such as working hours and basic leave entitlements.

In addition, women in informal work are unable to access existing or proposed Timorese social security schemes, and with an absence of occupational health and safety standards, some women are experiencing violence, harassment and other forms of coercion.

Recently established, the Centre needs your support so that it can continue to provide its excellent services to the working women of Timor Leste.

More details can be found on the APHEDA website:

http://www.apheda.org.au/news/1339482027_5810.html



Theresa and Ricar from Working Women's Centre in Timor Leste receive a cheque for \$1,000 from AETFA, at AETFA AGM/Public Meeting on 20th May. Flanked by AETFA Chair, Dr Richie Gun, and Sandra Dann from WWC SA

EDITOR: Bob Hanney (bohan@bluebottle.com). Assisted by AETFA committee members and friends.

Except where explicitly stated, news, commentary and discussion are provided for educational and informational purposes and do not represent the official position of the AETFA Committee.

ROXON BLOCKS RELEASE OF EAST TIMOR CABLES

Transcript from ABC Radio [PM](#), March 21, 2012
By Matt Peacock

Federal Attorney-General Nicola Roxon has blocked the release of cables about East Timor, despite the fact they are up to 37 years old. Ms Roxon decided to keep the documents secret on the grounds that opening them up would prejudice Australia's security.

Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes of the University of New South Wales believes the documents are being kept secret because they would reveal Australian complicity in concealing the mass starvation of 100,000 East Timorese. Professor Fernandes, a former Army intelligence officer who had one of the highest security clearances, requested the documents from the Federal Government. He told *PM* the Foreign Affairs Department even demanded secrecy for its reasons for hushing up the documents. "The Attorney-General has gone to water (with) the first whiff of grapeshot," he said. "She should have exhibited a bit more scepticism about claims on intelligence and national security. She hasn't done that. The Attorney-General has signed a certificate withholding even the reasons why they want the material kept secret. I wrote to her warning her against the possibility of being dazzled by claims as to sensitivity risk and security. I guess she just accepted whatever advice she was given."

Professor Fernandes says he knows what the documents are about. "The documents relate to cables written by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta back to Department of Foreign Affairs headquarters in Canberra in the late 1970s, and the documents also relate to profiles of Indonesian leaders in the early 1970s," he said. "The big problem with keeping them classified is that Indonesia has democratised; everything has changed. Suharto is not only out of office, he's actually dead. Nobody from that era is likely to be offended to the point where we couldn't do international relations and diplomacy with them."

He speculates the documents are being protected to hide Australian knowledge of the reasons for a massive famine in East Timor after Indonesia invaded. "There was massive famine, about 100,000 people dying in the space of a year out of a population of 640,000, so one of the largest losses of life relative to total population since the Holocaust," he said. "This famine occurred as a result, the direct result, of Indonesian military operations. Australia, I believe, had knowledge of this and chose to cover it up in order to protect the relationship with the Indonesian dictatorship."

"This would cause embarrassment to Australian diplomats, but it certainly wouldn't harm Australia's national security. I believe embarrassment is really what's being protected here."

History of secrecy

Professor Fernandes says the Department of Foreign Affairs does not have a culture of openness and transparency. "Unlike in other countries, where materials are automatically brought onto the public record, here we have to ask for them, and if they say no we've got to go to court," he said. "So it's prohibitively expensive and time consuming, except for

those like me who happen to be at a university and can run cases."

And he says there is a long history of the Department of Foreign Affairs concealing documents about Timor and Australia's role there. "The leaks of intelligence and cables that occurred in the 1970s exposed the fact that national security was being used as an alibi, not as a goal," he said. "From the '70s, '80s, '90s there's been a long history of deception, and unfortunately what's happened now is that the Attorney-General has allowed the department to once again shield itself. Really what ought to happen now is that the Foreign Minister Bob Carr should intervene personally and simply declassify the documents."

Professor Fernandes says Ms Roxon's action are in contrast to statements she made while in opposition. "In opposition she was talking about the importance of being open, transparent and the need to prevent the government holding on to materials that don't unnecessarily compromise national security," he said. "The fact is that we don't know what these documents are or whether they will compromise national security because the same Nicola Roxon has signed a certificate preventing us even knowing the reasons."

Ed. AETFA SA and the Australia West Papua Association SA sent a letter to Ms Roxon on 8 July 2012 supporting Professor Fernandes' attempts to have the documents released for public scrutiny: they may help identify Indonesian war criminals with a view to future prosecution for the sake of international justice. We also drew attention to the current atrocities being committed in West Papua with the same silence and inaction from our current Government.

ELECTION NEWS/ANALYSIS

Following the July 7 Parliamentary Elections, Xanana Gusmao has formed a coalition Government. His Party, the National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste (CNRT) with 30 seats has formed an alliance with the Democratic Party (PD) holding 8 seats and FRETIL with 2, giving the coalition a total of 40 seats in the 65 seat parliament.

FRETILIN with 25 seats will be in Opposition. FRETIL, formerly FRETILIN Mudanca, is led by people who defected from FRETILIN to align with Xanana in the 2006-07 crisis.

The CNRT won 36.7% of the total vote. FRETILIN received 29.9% of the total. In 2007, CNRT won only 24.1%, while FRETILIN won 29%.

CNRT's increased support came at the expense of the minor parties with which CNRT has been in coalition since 2007, ASDT, PSD, UNDERTIM and, to a lesser extent, PD.

In the April Presidential Elections Gusmao-supported, former army general, Taur Matan Ruak, won out against the FRETILIN candidate, Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres. Previous president, Jose Ramos Horta, lost in the first round.

While AETFA does not support political parties in Timor-Leste, it does follow the politics with interest and always supports human rights and sovereignty. The following contributions offer differing views on the Elections and their aftermath.

Excerpts from statement by La'ó Hamutuk (TL NGO which monitors development and aid), 12 July 2012)

La'ó Hamutuk feels that a multi-party state is essential to genuine democracy, to give space for a variety of perspectives to be discussed and considered with public participation. Parliament is the logical place for that to happen, and we are disappointed that there will be fewer parties in the next Parliament than in the past one. We hope that there will continue to be a strong, active Parliamentary opposition to critique and to propose alternatives to Government initiatives. This is necessary for transparency and public participation in setting the country's direction - regardless of who the Prime Minister and governing parties are.

With a President (Taur Matan Ruak) close to the Prime Minister, Timor-Leste will have fewer checks and balances than it has had during the last five years, when we had an independent President and a lively, pluralistic, Parliamentary opposition. Such checks called corruptors (sic) to account and prevented misguided initiatives like the [Timor-Leste Investment Company](#) and the proposed [Land Laws](#), as well as improving policies and projects.

But in recent years, as the state budget has escalated rapidly, fewer people are setting directions, and they are making mistakes. We hope that when the election period is over, Timor-Leste's leaders will focus their energies on managing the country's resources, services, directions and priorities. We look forward to more serious policy discussions than we saw during the election campaign. (Ed. The same could be said of Australia!)

The issues are critical -- Timor-Leste's Fifth Constitutional Government may be the last one with significant oil wealth to spend. If we do not use the income from exporting these resources to build our non-oil economy, reduce import dependency, strengthen agriculture and build strong human resources to replace the oil, we will face disaster soon after 2017. A Government without institutionalised (effective?) political opposition often makes poor decisions and ignores people's wishes, endangering the future of Timor-Leste's next generation.

Regardless of which parties are in Government, La'ó Hamutuk and other civil society organizations will continue to try to represent the needs and desires of less powerful and more vulnerable people. We hope we will have allies in Parliament to work with.

Timor-Leste's new government

By Professor Damien Kingsbury 16/07/2012
www.deakin.edu.au > [Communities](#)

On Sunday evening, 15 July 2012, a congress of CNRT party members in Dili voted to go into an alliance with the Democratic Party and Fretilin Mudanca to form a new

alliance to make up Timor-Leste's Fifth Constitutional Government. In response, members of Fretilin rioted, burning more than 50 cars and stoning UN police sent to quell the trouble. While it seemed as though Timor-Leste was again reverting to its violent past, this was less a return to politics by fire and more the last gasp of an out of touch political leadership on the verge of become irrelevant. It had always been expected that, should CNRT not achieve an absolute majority in its own right, that the Democratic Party would enter an alliance with it to form a majority. With Mudanca's two seats, CNRT only needed one more seat to form a majority and PD's eight seats took the new alliance well over the threshold 33 seats to a compelling 40 in the 65 seat parliament.

PD and Mudanca had been partners with CNRT in the previous government, with PSD-ASDT, so it seemed natural that the alliance continue. But PD and especially some of its senior figures had difficulty in their relations with CNRT's leader, Xanana Gusmao, and were openly canvassing the possibility of breaking away from a CNRT alliance. PD leader Fernando 'Lasama' de Araujo had met with Xanana a little over two weeks before the 7 July elections and it was believed that the two had discussed the possibility of forming an alliance following those elections. No details were made available about the discussion, but it was later confirmed by a source close to the parties that a deal, in principle at least, had then been struck. One view was that Xanana had confirmed to Lasama that he would, at some future point, anoint Lasama as his successor. To do so, however, would be to step over the ambitions of his own party's leaders and, of course, always remain subject to revision at some later date; nothing in politics is as guaranteed as facts on the ground. Political promises often mean very little.

It was instructive, too, that, having endorsed PD, former President, Jose Ramos-Horta, distanced himself from the party immediately after the meeting. His own plans, seemingly about trying to form an alliance between PD and ASDT, which he also supported, and thus creating a major third force in Timor-Leste politics, would not eventuate. Although it was never explicitly articulated, it appeared that Horta's plan was to help boost PD and ASDT's vote, take them into an alliance with Fretilin but with the proviso that Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri would not pursue the prime ministership. As a 'compromise candidate' and enjoying majority parliamentary support, Horta would then offer himself for this role... or be 'drafted' into it by the overwhelming will of the people. Horta's photograph on PD posters around Dili, with Lasama and Mariano 'Asanami' Sabino and his photo on ASDT posters with deceased leader Xavier do Amaral belied his intentions. But with PD doing a deal with Xanana, ASDT irretrievably split and its charismatic founding leader having died prior to the presidential elections, that party disappeared from the political stage. Horta, not a member of the party, was lined up with a person who was dead, both in a literal and figurative sense. By doing so, Horta had gone from being a rooster - a cock of the political walk, if not a fighting cock - to a feather duster, and his plans lay in ruins.

Yet while the deal between PD and CNRT was always expected, it was not as simple as a quick agreement. Post-election details needed to be sorted out. PD went into negotiations arguing that it did not want to see anyone who

had opposed Timor-Leste's independence appointed as a minister in the new government. This echoed an earlier call in the lead-up to the elections. PD also wanted a guaranteed number of ministries for its senior members, with the Social Solidarity and Finance Ministries both in its sights.

Keen to pressure Xanana, the Dili rumor-mill spun furiously as a Fretilin-PD deal was speculated upon. Yet had PD attempted such a move, its own voter base would have deserted it and the party would have split. Xanana could have simply approached disaffected PD members and invited them to join, or vote for, his government, which a few would probably have done. In terms of brinkmanship, Lasama had more to lose than Xanana.

For his own part, Xanana did not say in public what he wanted, but it was understood that the possibility of corruption investigations into some senior PD members weighed upon his deliberations. As a more conventional part of deal making, he would also have been looking for a senior posting for his Mudanca colleague, Jose Luis Guterres. Who was to become president of the parliament, who was to be deputy prime minister and who was to become foreign minister were all matters that would be thrown into the negotiating mix.

Yet in the background, Horta called for a 'government of national unity', to include Fretilin with CNRT. Seizing on this, Fretilin's Mari Alkatiri and Lu-Olo similarly called for a government of national unity, telling Fretilin members: 'Fretilin will indeed (join) this government... CNRT won more, but Fretilin will participate in this government.' Alkatiri said: 'Fretilin will participate in the governance from 2012 to 2017 so no need to be upset and concerned at the election result.'

These were ill-informed comments, failing to reflect the political reality that Fretilin opposed CNRT's Strategic Development Plan and that the two parties were at loggerheads over how to use the Petroleum Fund. Beyond this, Xanana could only ever have contemplated an alliance with Fretilin if the party abandoned its leaders, or they fell on their respective swords. But for a party in which its abrupt and somewhat overbearing leadership style appeared to be in the process of being transferred to its second generation, it was likely that Fretilin's leadership changes would have to be wholesale for a deal to be done, which was never likely. So, despite Xanana saying that CNRT had three options for the future, an alliance with Fretilin was only ever an option in a theoretical sense.

Unfortunately, however, Alkatiri and Lu-Olo's comments raised hopes among many Fretilin members that they would be returned from the political cold and again be able to bask in the glow of power. Fuel was added to this fire through the live broadcast of the CNRT conference, which formally made the decision on the alliance and which was fairly blunt in its rejection of some form of association with Fretilin. When the result on the alliance was announced, therefore, Fretilin supporters, angered and disappointed, rioted. It was a last ill-conceived hurrah for two leaders who were mortally politically wounded, seeking to have a final go-around before being venturing, voluntarily or otherwise, into that long walk into the wilderness of post-political irrelevance. For the rest of Timor-Leste, it was to be, more or less, business as usual; managing an economy with little understanding of how economies work, trying to push past

the bottleneck of Dili-centric development and the expense of the underfunded rural areas, tackling corruption while

also, if unwittingly, feeding into it but, most importantly and despite the blip on the violence radar and after a history of violence of mythic proportions, another five years across Timor-Leste of relative peace and stability.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ANALYSIS

(Excerpt from) **Bob Boughton**

11 July 2012

As an observer who has visited Timor-Leste two or three times every year since 2004, I have been struck by the obvious signs of growing private wealth in Dili, including expensive four wheel drive cars and ostentatious villas appearing along the waterfront and on the outskirts of the city. There is clearly a process of class formation taking place, while most rural areas, where over 70% of the population live, remain starved of resources. Illiteracy in the countryside is still very high, despite the significant contribution the Cubans have made with the mass literacy campaign initiated during the last year of the first FRETILIN government. The education system is also in serious need of resources, attracting a meagre 11% of the last state budget. While the oil fund has allowed the last government to increase astronomically the size of the state budget, much of this has gone on urban infrastructure and very little on social programs or improving agricultural productivity. If this trend continues, and a new middle class is consolidated in Dili, it will be very hard to break their hold on the state apparatus without a mass movement for social change of the kind that FRETILIN built in 1974-5 when it began its struggle for independence.

Bob Boughton was one of the SEARCH team International Observers for the election and has researched and published on Timor Leste education.

UNITED NATIONS EXPERT CALLS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMOR-LESTE

21 June 2012

"Ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth is the most crucial challenge facing Timor-Leste today", United Nations Special Rapporteur Magdalena Sepúlveda said Thursday during the presentation of her report* on her visit to Timor-Leste, at the Human Rights Council.

While recognizing Timor-Leste's progress in tackling the challenge of state-building and development only ten years after independence, the Special Rapporteur warned that "a harsh reality of entrenched poverty and rising inequality hides behind rapid macroeconomic growth indicators". She called on the State to concentrate its efforts on social and economic policies that ensure the enjoyment of human rights of the whole

population such as access to justice, education, health care, water and sanitation.

Timor-Leste has quickly emerged as one of Asia Pacific's fastest growing economies, primarily thanks to its oil and gas resources. However, around 40 per cent of the Timorese population still live below the poverty line and the country has one of the highest rates of child malnutrition in the world.

"I welcome the increase in budget allocation to social services, including health and education, adopted after my visit", said Ms. Sepúlveda. "However, I remain concerned by the fact that the budget allocation to physical infrastructure is disproportionately high, at the expense of resources for desperately-needed health services and quality education provision." Investing in health and education is an investment in the future of Timor-Leste and is critical for sustainable, people-centred development, the Special Rapporteur emphasised.

Land regime reform remains a complex issue for Timor-Leste, which has severe effects on access to land, housing and livelihoods for persons living in poverty. The Special Rapporteur therefore urged the Government to adopt a clear and stable legal framework on land titling, ensuring its compliance with international human rights standards and obligations.

Timor-Leste is rightly proud of its linguistic diversity. In this regard, Ms. Sepúlveda urged the Government to ensure that lack of proficiency in one of the official languages is not a barrier to the enjoyment of any human rights, especially access to justice, education and access to information.

The Special Rapporteur also called for increased efforts towards a more inclusive decision-making process, highlighting the current concentration of decision-making powers in Dili. "Development should be a "bottom up" process in which the population can meaningfully and effectively participate in the establishment of national priorities" she said.

(* See the full report:

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A.HRC.20.25.Add.1_En.PDF

Magdalena Sepúlveda was appointed as the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights in May 2008 by the United Nations Human Rights Council. She is independent from any government or organisation.

PARLIAMENTARIANS ADDRESS PUBLIC FORUM ON WEST PAPUA

(with thanks to Dave Arkins, AWPASA)

On 27 March a very successful Public Meeting on West Papua was held at the Hawke Centre at Uni SA. It was addressed by Sen. Nick Xenophon (who also chaired), Greens Sen. Richard di Natale and Jim Elmslie, an academic expert on West Papua. Around 110 people attended the function, one of the biggest for several years, and heard recent reports of torture, imprisonment and murder in the occupied land of the Papuan people.

Senator di Natale spoke about the formation of the Australian chapter of the International Parliamentarians for West Papua inaugural meeting in Canberra recently, where Federal politicians from different parties came together for West Papua. He was confident that soon a properly constituted parliamentary sub-committee would be formed when a minimum of 10 federal parliamentarians sign up.

Instead of calling for Independence, Sen. Di Natale preferred a more pragmatic approach of concentrating on human rights abuses, open access to West Papua for media and NGOs, the gaoling of political prisoners and the rights of Papuans to express themselves without violence and intimidation from the Indonesian Military. He also expressed an interest in visiting West Papua as part of a parliamentary delegation and would look to organising this in the future.

A number of resolutions were passed unanimously by the meeting which was co-organised by the AWPASA, AETFA, the UN Assoc. of Australia (SA) and the Australian Institute of International Affairs (SA).

VIOLENCE IN WEST PAPUA: THE VULNERABLE BECOME INDONESIA'S LATEST TARGET

2 July 2012

<http://theconversation.edu.au/violence-in-west-papua-the-vulnerable-become-indonesias-latest-target-7783>

Why has West Papua's non-violent student movement, the West Papuan National Committee (KNPB), become the latest target of a campaign of terror in West Papua?

Calls for a referendum

Since Indonesia's 1963 takeover of West Papua from the Dutch, the occupation has been characterised by [oppression and violence](#).

Indonesia's unwillingness to allow West Papua a chance to choose its political future stems largely from the revenue it pulls in from the US-owned gold and copper mine in West Papua, [Freeport McMoRan](#).

In passing months, the KNPB has organised protests across West Papua that call for an independence referendum. This has placed unbearable pressure on Indonesia. The protests

have also raised awareness of the abuses committed by Indonesian security forces against indigenous Papuans, as noted at the May 2010 United Nations Periodic Review. Indonesia's human rights record has also elicited criticism from Germany. This criticism was the precursor to a month of shocking violence in West Papua. Perhaps this is why KNPB has been the focus of the Indonesian security apparatus' latest attack on indigenous West Papuans.

Assassination, violence, and protest

The broad daylight assassination of KNPB deputy chairperson Mako Tabuni on June 14 by police, has enraged the indigenous resistance movement triggering a backlash of riots and fresh violence in West Papua's largest town, [Jayapura](#).

Police claim Mako was [armed with a police rifle](#) and resisted arrest. Eyewitnesses to the murder disagree, saying Mako was standing at a kiosk eating betel nut when several cars pulled up and shot him on the spot.

A week before the assassination, [Buchtar Tabuni](#), the chairperson of the KNPB, was arrested for organising student demonstrations in West Papua. Police claim they pursued and killed Mako because of confessions from an incarcerated Buchtar that Mako had been responsible for several murders earlier that month, including of other KNPB members.

Mako had actually been campaigning for an independent investigation into the killings. The spokesperson of an Indonesian NGO for victims of violence, Kontras Papua, said that the Papuan police had spun myriad lies in the aftermath of Mako's assassination.

The police allegation was categorically denied by KNPB spokesperson, Victor Yeimo, whom I spoke to several days ago. Yeimo attested to Mako's commitment to non-violence and queried why KNPB would be shooting its own members.

Police and the Indonesian security forces have illogically pinned the murder of KNPB members and others on the Papuan indigenous resistance movement, and a police wanted list is circulating with more KNPB names listed. On 23-4 June, five KNPB members were allegedly detained by [Densus 88](#) (Indonesia's Australian-trained counter-terrorism unit) forces, and families of the five are worried as they have not been seen since.

In the week following Germany's denunciation of Indonesia's treatment of West Papuans at the UN Universal Periodic Review, a [German tourist was shot](#) in Jayapura by an indigenous-looking gunman police claim may have been Mako Tabuni.

In a handy turn of events for police the tourist's wife was unable to identify Tabuni due to his murder, and the legal system is saved from subjecting him to due process. The shooting may well have been executed by another indigenous Papuan. The use of ethnic Papuans to carry out Indonesian military dirty-work is a well known occurrence. The timing of Germany's criticism and the shooting of the German tourist is unnerving.

Military violence has also spread to West Papua's highland town, [Wamena](#). When two soldiers [hit a child whilst speeding](#), the local community retaliated by killing one of the soldiers. Hundreds of soldiers from the local battalion

came back later for revenge, running amok by setting fires, shooting into crowds and vandalising houses.

Over the past month the shooting spree in West Papua has claimed at least 18 lives. This is partly the work of trained killers, with snipers targeting vital organs.

The leaders of the two largest churches in West Papua, [Benny Giay](#) and [Socrates Sofyan Yoman](#), assert that the mysterious killings are politically motivated and have left indigenous Papuans in fear of leaving their homes. [Human Rights Watch](#) also reports that the government continues to overlook the need to investigate the violence, barring monitors and journalists from entering Papua to investigate.

Justice and Australia's role

It seems unlikely that those to blame will be brought to justice, as Indonesian President [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono](#) has made light of the soldiers' rampage by labeling it "[inappropriate action](#)". He has called the shootings in Papua "[small-scale](#)" in comparison to those taking place in the Middle East.

Where is this leader's compassion for his people? Or are Papuans' deaths so insignificant that they only merit attention when statistically matched to those in other global tragedies?

The recent shootings in Papua are, sadly, nothing new for West Papuans, although the frequency of lethality and the accompanying power of the Papuan backlash by way of protest are increasing.

As Indonesian security forces fan the flames of West Papuans' independence aspirations, Australia must end its assistance to them.

By [training Indonesia's counter-terrorism forces](#) accused of carrying out much of the current violence in Papua, Australia is more of an accomplice to Indonesian crimes than it was via its wilful ignorance during the lead up to the intervention in East Timor.

It will be an embarrassment to Australia, but a blessing to West Papuans if, because of the violence that Australian expertise helps finesse, Australia is forced to intervene to prevent genocide in West Papua in the near future.

Netherlands Sorry For 1947 Indonesia Massacre

AFP December 10, 2011

The Dutch government has formally apologised for a 1947 massacre on Indonesia's Java island in an emotional ceremony on the anniversary of the executions by its colonial army.

Dutch troops swooped into a village in the town of Rawagede during Indonesia's fight for independence and executed men and boys as their families and neighbours looked on. Dutch officials say 150 people were killed, but a support group and the local community say the death toll was 431.

"In this context and on behalf of the Dutch government, I apologise for the tragedy that took place in Rawagede on December 9, 1947," Netherlands ambassador to Indonesia Tjeerd de Zwaan said. He then repeated the apology in the Indonesian language to the applause of hundreds of people attending the ceremony, some of whom broke down in tears

as they listened in front of a marble monument commemorating the dead.

In a landmark ruling, a Hague-based civil court in September found the Dutch state responsible for the executions and ruled in favour of eight widows and a survivor of the massacre who brought the case to court. Two of the widows have died since launching the case, and so has the survivor, Saih Bin Sakam, who passed away in May at the age of 88. The Netherlands agreed to pay 850,000 euro (\$1.12 million) to the community before the court's decision, and will now pay an additional 180,000 euro in compensation to the plaintiffs or their families.

District head Ade Swara said the apology marked a new beginning for Indonesia and the Netherlands, adding that sorry was "more than just a word...This apology gives our younger generation a sense of patriotism, a sense that Rawagede can progress and that Indonesia is a place where human rights can flourish," he said.

Netherlands faces more massacre compo claims

The Dutch government might have to pay more compensation for human rights violations after it formally apologised for (the) massacre. The case may now open up the country to further compensation claims as the government has been accused of other mass killings. Human rights lawyer Professor Liesbeth Zegveld, who took on the case to a Dutch court, says she never expected to win because the case was so old.

"It's historic. It hasn't happened before, not in the Netherlands, not anywhere else. It just hasn't been seen, a case 60 years ago, crimes that have not become time bound and victims must be compensated. I had not expected this outcome," she said.

Professor Zegveld says the Dutch government is accused of other massacres in the 1940s in places like South Sulawesi, where possibly thousands of people were killed.

But thousands of cases are not expected as the Dutch court ruled only men who survived the massacre or the widows were eligible for compensation.

"All the next generations have been cut off. The court ruled that their claim has expired," Professor Zegveld said.

THE GREATER SUNRISE OIL AND GAS PROJECT

The Greater Sunrise oil and gas field in the Timor Sea has been the subject of exploration, controversy, and negotiations since it was first discovered in 1974. In particular, the question of where to liquefy the natural gas - converting it into LNG which can be shipped to overseas customers - has been vociferously debated since Indonesia was forced out of Timor-Leste in 1999. After moving ahead in fits and starts, the Sunrise project is now getting closer to reality. See:

<http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Sunrise/10Sunrise.htm>

Accord on gas pipeline (abridged)

by Risen Jayaseelan 21 May 2012 risen@thestar.com.my

PETALING JAYA: The Timor Leste government has inked a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to partner with Germany's Europipe GmbH to build a much-needed gas pipeline from a massive offshore oil and gas field (Greater Sunrise) to the impoverished country's mainland. The project is co-managed by Malaysian firm and regional representative of Europipe, [Petro-Mekong Corp Sdn Bhd](#). (L)ast Wednesday, a sample of the deep-sea pipe was unveiled at Timor Leste's parliament house by [Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao](#) and has now become a permanent display structure there.



People viewing the specimen of the deep sea pipe air-flown from Germany by Europipe in the centre of Timor-Leste's Parliament House

(T)he Timor Leste government...said it was working closely with Europipe "to commence implementation of the pipeline to bring their natural gas direct to the shores of Timor Leste for the development of the country's own oil and gas industry". The cost of the pipeline and pipe laying is estimated at US\$1bil to US\$2bil, while a further US\$5bil (RM15.7bil) is expected to be spent on building gas separation and processing plants and an integrated petroleum supply base on the mainland in Timor Leste.

Gusmao...has been actively seeking to ensure that a pipeline is built from the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field into Timor Leste in order for the country to enjoy more economic benefits and spinoffs from its own natural resources.

The Timor Leste government and Australian oil and gas giant Woodside, which has been developing another oil and gas field (Bayu Undan) off the waters of Timor Leste following an earlier agreement with the then (Indonesian-controlled East Timor) have been at loggerheads on this issue.

Woodside has said it would prefer to build the first-of-its-kind floating processing plant at the oil field itself at a cost of US\$8bil to US\$10bil.

When asked about Woodside estimates that the Timor Leste pipeline option would cost US\$5bil more than a floating station, Timor Leste's [secretary of state Alfredo Pires](#) was quoted by ABC Radio Australia as saying: "Probably the word is rubbish. One pipeline has gone to Australia. We think it's only fair that the other one comes to Timor Leste so we can share the benefits as well."

Pires was also quoted as saying his government was convinced that Europipe and its partners could carry out the project.

"What was said before, that to make such a pipeline would be outside the technology envelope, is not the case. It is very do-able. They can actually make this pipe in two months."

Both Pires and Gusmao had visited the Europipe factories in Germany earlier in the year, it has been reported.

Fate of East Timor's stolen generation in Indonesia finally coming to light

Lindsay Murdoch, SMH

March 5, 2012

They were East Timor's stolen generation. Between 1975 and 1999 about 4000 young and vulnerable Timorese were secretly taken to Indonesia where some of them were forced to work in slave-like conditions while others were educated and grew up with the families of soldiers.

Until now little was known of the fate of the children, some of whom were abducted and others whose parents were coerced or deceived into giving them away. Following research in Indonesia and East Timor an Australian academic, Helene van Klinken, has published the first detailed account of the practice she says was an example of "hegemonic power using children in its goal of dominating the subordinate group to which the children belong".

"Those who took children acted out of mixed and varied motivations, ranging from genuine compassion and good intentions to the less benevolent manipulation and use of vulnerable children for economic, political and ideological ends," Dr Van Klinken says. While white Australian officials removed Aboriginal children from their families last century to educate them, the Indonesians removed many Timorese children because they did not have children of their own or to work for their families.

"They also wanted to adopt the children of the resistance as a way to punish, weaken and humiliate the enemy," Dr Van Klinken says in a new book, *Making them Indonesians*, published by Monash University Publishing.

"The children were there for them to take like other spoils of war, and bringing home a child became for some proof of their success in dominating the East Timorese."

Dozens of children were taken from Timorese refugee camps in 1999 and put in Indonesian institutions partly because those responsible knew the children would help them attract donors. Another motivation was to educate the children to struggle for the future reintegration of East Timor, whose people voted for independence in 1999.

"But most did not become collaborators in the East Timor integration project as the Indonesians had hoped," she says. "Their experiences and those of their parents and families living under abusive, Indonesian military rule led most of them to reject integration."

Many of the children from Catholic families were raised as Muslims in Indonesia. "The East Timorese were expected to return home and spread Islamic faith among indigenous East Timorese," Dr Van Klinken says.

Many children had difficulty studying in Indonesia because of the trauma they had experienced and many suffered from the side-effects of malnutrition. But some did succeed.

The adopted son of Indonesian Major-General Kiki Syahnakri became a senior public servant. Timorese adoptee Toni Taulo became a TV actor, Sebastian da Costa became a well-known tennis player and Thomas Americo was the first boxer in Indonesia to compete against an international title holder.

Dr Van Klinken says that up to 10 Timorese youths lived at the house of Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, a special forces intelligence officer who oversaw the organisation of pro-integration militia in East Timor in 1999, where they cleaned, did the gardening and guard duty but were not sent to school.

One of them, Hercules Rozario Marcal, became a notorious gang leader in Jakarta. And Alfredo Reinado, who wept as he was forcibly removed from his mother in East Timor in 1978, became a renegade military officer who was shot dead at the home of East Timor's President Jose Ramos-Horta in 2008.

In a foreword to the book, Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, wife of East Timor's Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, says there are many Timorese families who still "long to meet their missing children" in Indonesia.

She hopes that Timorese taken to Indonesia when they were children realise they are not alone in their experience.

"I hope they will search for their families and those who took the children to Indonesia will assist them in their search," she says.

Read more: <http://www.smh.com.au/world/fate-of-east-timors-stolen-generation-in-indonesia-finally-coming-to-light-20120304-1ub38.html#ixzz1oCxK7eOn>

BOOKS:

"Secrecy - The Key to independence" - stories of women in the Clandestine movement in the Timorese Resistance 1975 – 1999, collected by Isabel "Beba" Sequiera & Laura Soares Abrantes.

Secrecy was launched at the Sydney Writers Festival on May 20th, the 10th anniversary of independence for East Timor, by two women who reveal the role women played fighting with the men in the country's resistance to Indonesian Occupation. Laura and "Beba" have compiled a book of twelve women's oral histories, wanting to gain recognition from their government of the role women played in achieving self-determination.